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MOVED BY WAR

Migration, Diaspora and the Korean War

ji-yeon yuh

THE STUDY OF KOREAN MIGRATION has long been a stepchild constrained by the nationalist visions of larger and more powerful fields. Among U.S. scholars, Korean migration largely has been defined as immigration to the United States and examined within the sometimes conflicting contexts of Asian American studies and immigration/assimilation studies.¹ Within Korean studies, Korean migration has been of interest primarily as another perspective from which to examine the nation, such that the most researched aspect of Korean migration isn't migration at all but rather the overseas activities of Korean nationalists and independence fighters.² In short, the questions asked of Korean migration have been rooted in research agendas that take the nation, whether the United States or colonial Korea or South Korea, as its point of reference. It is only in the past decade that scholarly attention has turned to Korean migration with something approaching seriousness. Yet most scholarly approaches remain constrained by national paradigms and the difficulties of multiple-country research. The result is a lack of global perspective on what is most surely a global phenomenon. Although preliminary, this article is an attempt to sketch a global framework for post-1945 Korean migration. The goal is not so much to show linkages—by now we all know that migration is about global linkages—but to stimulate research questions rooted within migration itself and to transcend nation-bound perspectives.

Post-1945 Korean migration has been shaped by the division and militarization of the Korean peninsula. The Korean War in particular has had a dramatic and profound impact. Most, if not all, of Korean migration since 1950 can be traced to the war and its consequences. Taking the Korean War as a starting point for discussing Korean migration highlights the international nature of that migration, reminding us forcefully that Korean migration is a global phenomenon linking multiple countries in multiple ways. The many different kinds of migrants—military brides, adoptees, labor migrants, political exiles, international students turned immigrants—ended up in dozens of countries around the world. With the exception of adoptees, most fall in the broad category I term “refuge migrants,” those seeking refuge from the consequences of the Korean War. This migration—although spurred by the nationalist struggle embodied in the war and division—leads to community and identity configurations that rely on shared memory and experience rather than nation-state ties.

The most immediate migrations spurred by the war were military bride migration and adoption migration, and both were heavily oriented toward the United States. Since 1950, more than 100,000 Korean military brides have immigrated to the United States. Due to the ongoing military relationship between South Korea and the United States, Korean women are still marrying U.S. soldiers and arriving in America. At its peak in the 1970s and 1980s, more than 4,000 women were arriving annually. Now, it's estimated that about 2,000 per year are immigrating. The majority of Korean immigration to the United States during the 1970s and early 1980s can be traced to military brides, who sponsored relatives and thus became the first link in chain migrations. By inviting their family members under the family reunification provision of U.S. immigration law, it is estimated that military brides are responsible (directly and indirectly) for bringing forty to fifty percent of all Korean immigrants since 1965.³ Some women are the beginning of chain migrations that include dozens of extended family members. Nearly every military bride I met had invited at least one family member to the United States.

The first Korean military brides began arriving in the 1950s. Of the more than 150 women whom I met during the early and mid-1990s, the

earliest to arrive had come in 1951. As wives of U.S. citizens, they were able to immigrate during a time when immigration from Korea and most of Asia was legally blocked. Thus, they make up the largest group of Korean immigrants to the United States between 1945 and 1965, when immigration laws were liberalized after some five decades of strict, anti-Asian immigration restrictions. Daniel B. Lee notes that between 1962 and 1968, Korean women who immigrated as wives of U.S. citizens accounted for 39.4 percent, the largest single immigration category, of all Korean immigration to the United States. Lee estimates that between 1950 and 1989, some 90,000 Korean women immigrated to America as wives of U.S. soldiers.⁴ They followed their husbands to every corner of the United States.

Adoption migration is the other immediate category of migration traceable to the Korean War. Evangelicals Bertha and Harry Holt saw dozens of abandoned babies in South Korea, many of them fathered by American soldiers, and they began an adoption service in 1955. A year earlier in 1954, the South Korean government had created a social service agency whose purpose was to place Korean children for overseas adoption. The demand for babies in the United States and in Europe turned out to be pretty strong. Initially, the emphasis was on placing orphans and on mixed-race children left behind by their non-Korean fathers. But by the 1960s, international adoption from Korea was dealing in children whose parents were pressured by poverty, and by the 1970s, as the rate of pregnancy among unmarried women rose, young pregnant women were being sequestered in homes for unwed mothers and pressured to give up their babies. Approximately 200,000 children have been sent to the United States and another 50,000 to Europe, where they make up the largest ethnic Korean community in that region. The latest statistics show that annually about 2,000 are still being sent overseas despite dramatic increases in the rate of domestic adoptions.⁵

Although most Korean adoptees are not war orphans, the image of the Korean War orphan seems virtually indelible. One Korean American woman recalls that her adoptive mother always told her that her biological father had died in the Korean War and that she was a war orphan. Armed with that information, she repressed the vague memories of parents and siblings from her early childhood in Korea as mere dreams. As a

young adult, this woman discovered that although she had been born in 1957, the Korean War had ended in 1953. No longer able to repress those dreams, she set out to search for her biological family, and she found them, mother, siblings, and a whole extended family. That woman, of course, is Deann Borshay Liem, who chronicled her journey in the documentary film, *First Person Plural*.

The Korean War, due to the particularly complex political situation of the early Cold War as it unfolded in East Asia, also created a small group of Korean POWs who refused to be repatriated to either North or South Korea. Fifty-five of them ended up in Brazil. When South Korea began to send migrants to South America, primarily to Brazil, in the early 1960s, these former POWs became the nucleus of what is now an ethnic Korean community of about 50,000 in that country. Furthermore, many Koreans re-migrated to the United States from South America and have formed their own communities at the interstices of Korean American and Latin American immigrant communities.⁶

But, why were South Koreans migrating to Brazil in the 1960s? That migration was pushed by the Park Chung Hee government, specifically through the 1963 Emigration Act, to relieve perceived pressures of unemployment and to increase foreign exchange earnings. The same act also encouraged labor migration to Germany, most notably of men who worked in mining and women who worked as nurses. Thus, Germany has the largest community of adult Korean immigrants in Europe and boasts a second generation of German-born and German-speaking Koreans, many of them the multi-racial children of Koreans and Germans.⁷

But, what does this migration have to do with war? War was an ever-present threat in the decades following the 1953 armistice that ended military hostilities, and those who could grabbed the chance to escape. This desire to leave matched up nicely with South Korean government concerns about overpopulation and unemployment leading to a restless populace less easily controlled and less likely to put up with the rigors of maintaining a society on the constant alert for war. Hence the 1963 Emigration Act encouraging South Koreans to migrate abroad. Thus, I argue that the Korean War created an expanded refugee migration that led Koreans to Europe, Latin America, and the United States in search of secu-

rity. I call this development *refuge migration*. This refugee migration is hidden in other categories, such as the marriage migration of military brides and the labor and professional migration of miners, doctors and nurses. Although ostensibly migrants or immigrants rather than refugees fleeing from an immediate danger, their life narratives demonstrate that flight from war and its consequences is a crucial factor in their migration.

As a United Nations-defined category, refugee migration is limited in scope, and the process of its definition can be overtly political. But, most scholars and refugee workers agree that whether or not they have official UN designation as such, refugees are fleeing an immediate danger such as war or persecution. Often, the definition of a refugee—whether by the UN, aid workers, or scholars—is tied to the equally politicized definition of human rights: refugees are fleeing situations where their human rights are being violated or are in immediate danger of being violated. Economics—like a famine—generally isn’t considered enough unless the famine is immediately life-threatening.

Refuge migrants, on the other hand, are fleeing perceived danger and seeking peace of mind. This is significantly different from the traditional immigration model in which immigrants are seeking a better life, a better education, and an opportunity to move up the economic ladder. Refugee migrants are motivated by a deep psychological need to leave behind chaos, and insecurity, and trauma, and they seek out emotional/mental peace and a stable environment that doesn’t feel like it’s always threatening to explode. The consequences of the Korean War have created an environment in Korea, especially in South Korea, where the urge to leave behind trauma and seek peace of mind has been particularly strong. But because migration has been categorized as labor migration, family migration, or economic migration (that is, “seeking the American Dream” migration), this refugee migration has not been recognized as such.

The story of Cho Soonyi, who left South Korea for the United States in 1951, barely a year after the Korean War broke out, is the story of a military bride whose migration bears the hallmarks of refugee migration. Indeed, one could argue that she is a war refugee, for she left Korea at the height of the Korean War. Growing up in colonial Korea, she had always longed to escape what she saw as a backward, stagnant country. Once the

war broke out, getting out of Korea became a top priority, as Ms. Cho explained:

I wanted to . . . get out . . . Korea . . . Go foreign country. Japan, America, don't matter. So I, I, that's, that was my wish so, only way you can come to America is you have to marry.

Marrying an American, however, was much easier said than done. Although, by her own account, there were many Americans who wanted to marry Korean and Japanese women, such marriages did not give these Asian brides the legal right to enter America until the law restricting Korean and Japanese immigration to the U.S. was lifted in 1952. For Ms. Cho, that made marriage pointless: "*You can marry, but, you marry, you cannot come with your husband. So why, why should you get married?*" Even after American immigration laws were revised to allow Asian military brides to accompany their husbands to America, red tape made the process difficult.⁸ Besides, meeting a suitable American man wasn't easy either. It was only a series of lucky breaks, she said, that made it possible for her to leave Korea:

I was a lucky enough to meet nice young man, you know. I met and I come over Japan and got marry. Ah . . . everything was just like a planned. I got very fortunate, lucky.

While working as a sales clerk at a PX in Seoul, she began to date a white American soldier, an enlisted man. In 1949 he was transferred to Japan. The Korean War broke out the following spring. With the help of another friend, she was able to board a ship in Incheon, a port city near Seoul, and flee to Japan. There she managed to find her American boyfriend. At age twenty-one, Ms. Cho became Mrs. Mullen and one of eleven Korean women in 1951 to enter the United States as wives of American citizens.⁹

Grandmother Lee, who immigrated on the basis of her nursing profession, is also a refugee migrant. She grew up in what is now North Korea in a Christian family during the Japanese colonial period. Through missionaries, she went to Shanghai to study nursing. She worked at a mission hospital there after graduation. Then World War II ended, and when Korea was liberated from Japan, there was talk of something called the 38th

Parallel and dividing Korea in two, and she decided to return home. It was chaos once she reached northeast China. Thousands of Koreans were scrambling to return home, trains were packed, and Russian soldiers were everywhere. When she arrived home, she found that her family was doing better than most because they had some land and were able to grow their own food. Soon, though, they discovered that they were suspect to the communist Koreans who were beginning to take over the northern half of Korea. First, they were Christian; and second, they were landowners. The family had some difficulties, and these problems only increased after the Korean War broke out in June 1950. Grandmother Lee, by this time the mother of three young children, took a job as an interpreter for the U.S. military when they passed near her hometown. She had learned English in China during her education as a nurse. One day, the unit for which she worked asked her to get on a boat and come with them below the 38th Parallel. It would be just for a few days, her commander said. At the time, UN forces controlled the area. But, the day after they crossed the 38th, intense fighting broke out and she never made it back to the other side. She was stuck in the southern half, away from her husband and three small children, away from her family, in a land full of strangers. Over the next two decades, she worked as an interpreter and as a nurse. She made connections with churches and missionaries. She worked in camptowns, treating military prostitutes for venereal disease and in orphanages treating abandoned children. She was the epitome of the caring, successful nurse and socially engaged, educated woman. But, her personal life was painful. Every night, she had the same nightmare: she stands in front of a thick black river. On the other side stand her three children, crying out for their mother. She cannot go to them, for something invisible holds her back as she strains to cross that thick black river. So every night she woke up drenched in a cold sweat. Some days, when she had no work, she would go to the port city of Incheon and trail her hand in the waters of the Yellow Sea, thinking to herself, these waters flow to the shores of the North, where my children are.

One day, she could no longer stand being so close and yet so far, knowing that it was only a few hours drive north and knowing also that she could not make that drive. So, she used her missionary connections to

obtain a job as a nurse in a California hospital. It was the 1970s, and she was among the first of the nurse migrants from South Korea to enter the United States.¹⁰ She was running away from national division and the pain of separated families, but that dream followed her across the Pacific. Even in sunny California, so far removed from Korea and its problems, she still woke up nightly drenched in that cold sweat, that black river still visible, the calls of her children still ringing in her ears, the guilt still as sharp. She died a few years ago in rural Georgia, never having seen or heard from her children again. Although she wanted to reach out and find them as so many other separated families had found each other since the 1980s, she was afraid that her background as an interpreter for the U.S. military and as a Christian would harm her children by association. So, she didn't search for them.¹¹

Ms. Cho/Mrs. Mullen and Grandmother Lee demonstrate that what seems like marriage migration or labor migration may actually be refugee migration. Mrs. Mullen was fleeing a war and a place that she views as a backwards, colonized, place. Mrs. Mullen also put a romantic, modern gloss on her refugee story. Although she had already described her marriage as "lucky" because through it she achieved her goal, she emphasized later in her narrative that it was the result of a very modern "falling in love." Grandmother Lee's migration, on the surface professional labor migration, was actually a flight from the trauma of war, national division, and separated families. Her migration can also be counted among those Korean immigrants who are originally from the North. Some scholars estimate that they may account for as much as 40 percent of Korean immigration to the United States. In my interviews with such immigrants, they speak of the fear of renewed war, their social alienation in the South as a northerner, and the search for stability as motivating factors in their migration.

While Korean migration is generally seen as only coming from South Korea, there has been movement in and out of North Korea as well. Consider the case of Mr. Park, whom I interviewed in northeastern China. His case is difficult to categorize, for it has elements of return migration, of refugee migration, and of exile. He was born somewhere around the border between Manchuria and Korea in the 1930s and grew up in Manchuria. He fought in the Chinese army during the Korean War, and when

the war ended he stayed in North Korea, where he was given work as a journalist and where he married and began to raise a family. One might say that the war brought him back home, except that he possessed Chinese citizenship as a veteran of the army and he always felt curiously left out of North Korean society. The Korea he remembered from childhood was not this divided Korea. In the early 1970s, he had returned to China with his family and, while he declined to elaborate, was probably a victim of the various purges that North Korea undertook to rid the country of ethnic Koreans with foreign citizenship.¹² When he told me his life story in 2001, he was living in a rural area of Yanbian, the autonomous Korean prefecture near the border with Korea. In his village were several other veterans who had also stayed in North Korea only to return to China in the 1970s with their North Korean wives.

Then there is Mrs. Kim, who had come to China in the 1950s as a guardian for North Korean war orphans and had ended up marrying an ethnic Korean in China. As she explained while narrating her life story to me in 2001, North Korea designated war orphans as children of martyrs and developed a special system to educate and raise them. The children were sent in groups to friendly socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and China, accompanied by nurses, guardians, and teachers. In addition to attending local schools, they were also given daily education in Korean language, history, and other subjects. When they came of age, they were called back to attend college or other institutions in North Korea. Host countries subsidized the education and care of these children. There is very little, if anything at all, about these children in the literature on North Korea, on migration, or on orphans.

Finally, there are the refugees from North Korea, who despite multiple requests have not been granted official refugee status by the United Nations. Since the 1990s, Koreans have been crossing over into China in a wave of refugees fleeing from famine. While they are primarily seeking asylum in South Korea and hiding out in China, they are also going to countries such as Mongolia and seeking refuge in the diplomatic offices of sympathetic countries. Their migrations can be traced to the Korean War and its impact on the Korean peninsula, for while the ongoing famine in North Korea is the immediate cause, the instability, repression, and

conflict created by the political result of the Korean War, the framework of national division and opposing nation-states, are underlying causes.¹³ In the summer and early fall of 2001, I met with nearly twenty North Korean refugees hiding out in China—elderly men and women, young couples with children, middle-aged women who had crossed the border for food and other goods to take back to families in North Korea—and each one stated that the fear of another war was pervasive. It was clear from their accounts that the threat of war was used to control the population and justify the extreme militarization of the North in ways similar to the militarization of the South that reached its apex in the 1970s and 1980s under Park Chung Hee and Chun Du Hwan.

The exodus out of North Korea has resulted in an influx into South Korea. Once limited to a trickle of political defectors that had amounted to just over 600 total through 1993, the number of North Koreans entering South Korea soared from an annual rate below ten to fifty-four in 1994. Since then, North Koreans have been entering South Korea at a rate that has dramatically increased, from 148 in 1999 to 1,285 in 2003, according to South Korea's Ministry of Unification. With resettlement aid from the South Korean government, they are trying to integrate into South Korean society, but the process is difficult. They are a different type of immigrant—not quite refugees and not quite defectors, now living in the other half of their native country, a half rendered oddly foreign through six decades of division and political animosity and yet eerily familiar as well. Yet they are not a new type. Instead, they are following in the footsteps of the war refugees of the 1950s, the northerners who went south and the southerners who went north in an internal migration that became an international migration with the closing of the border at the DMZ that demarcates North Korea and South Korea. Despite a common language, culture, and history, these migrants found themselves in vastly different social and political worlds where the other half was routinely maligned as the ultimate enemy. For those northerners who came south in the 1950s, the most common response was to cultivate a stridently public anti-communism, in part to counter suspicions that all northerners were spies for the communist North and in part because the South Korean government demanded it.¹⁴ But, that option is not viable for most of

the recent refugees, who can see the flaws of the capitalist South as easily as the flaws of the communist North, and thus many find themselves struggling to find meaning in their lives and to reconcile their historical and social perspectives with those of their new comrades, the South Koreans. But, the South Koreans have proven to be not particularly welcoming. Just as southerners had shunned the northerners who came south in the 1950s, South Koreans are shunning the North Korean refugees. Parents complain if a North Korean child attends the same school as their children, employers prefer not to hire northerners, and even landlords prefer not to rent to northerners. South Koreans also display a distinct superiority complex toward northerners, such that an early North Korean defector wrote a memoir of his experience in South Korea titled “Are You Really So Much Better Than Us?”¹⁵

While the origins of Korean migration in the Korean War can be kept within the framework of the nation, the consequences of that migration cannot. A diasporic consciousness is developing among the younger generations, but this is not the classic diaspora oriented toward the homeland. Rather, it is a consciousness that takes the diaspora, not the homeland, as the point of reference and seeks community in multiple arenas: among other diasporic Koreans, among other racial and ethnic minorities, in local communities, in international networks.

It is perhaps epitomized in communities of adoption migrants. The Korean adoptee organizations in the United States that have been formed by adult adoptees (rather than by adoptive parents or social workers) and similar organizations formed in Europe are primarily interested in getting to know each other and forming a community of Korean adoptees. This is very clear in the mission statement of the 2004 Gathering, which drew more than 400 Korean adoptees from around the world to Seoul. This was the third such gathering; the first had been held in D.C. in 1999 and the second in Oslo in 2001. One might surmise that a gathering in the homeland carried special meaning and that this sentiment would be reflected in the mission statement. But, the mission statement says little about connecting to roots or rediscovering one’s Koreanness. Rather, it is focused on creating networks among adoptees worldwide and creating an international community of Korean adoptees. Their interest is not in

the so-called homeland. It is in each other and the community they might create together. With the growing awareness that there are other ethnic Koreans in other locales around the world, there is an accompanying sense of global connections more important than the bilateral connection between one's Korean "homeland" and one's country of residence.

In the 1980s, ethnic Koreans in China read with great interest a series of articles in the Korean-language *Yanbian Daily* on ethnic Korean communities around the world. Jung Pan-ryong, a scholar of Korean literature and an ethnic Korean in China, had written the articles after visiting these communities on various overseas trips following the liberalization of China. For his fellow Koreans in China, his articles—which later were published as a book—opened up a whole new world of Korean diaspora.¹⁶ One middle-aged woman in Yanji City noted that she was overwhelmed to discover so many different Koreans, so many different life styles, and yet so many similar struggles as a minority. As a result, she explained, her sense of identity as a Korean had expanded beyond Korea and China and she had begun to see that she was part of a global phenomenon.¹⁷

This is the direction that the Korean diaspora as a whole is taking. Their origins may be in wars fought in the homeland, and assimilation into the majority culture of their countries of residence may be the expectation; but, their envisioned future is in diasporic communities and identities that privilege neither the homeland as the center nor assimilation as the goal. Expressions of this global diasporic consciousness came up in different contexts and in different forms during fieldwork in ethnic Korean communities, and in interviews conducted between 1999 and 2003 with more than 200 ethnic Koreans of all ages and social classes in China, Japan, and the United States. They are of course not common to all ethnic Koreans. The immigrant generation was the least likely to express such sentiments, the younger generations the most likely. But, such expressions are reinforced by changes in ethnic Korean communities and the increasing number of global connections among different diasporic groups.

The upshot of this is that Korea, whether North or South, is getting decentered in the diaspora. Overseas Koreans are no longer looking to Korea as their primary reference point for an identity that lifts them above the stereotypical labels accorded racialized minorities. Instead, they are

identifying with others in diaspora and with fellow minorities. They are asserting their brand of Koreanness as authentic and are challenging the authenticity of Koreanness in Korea. At the same time, they are also asserting themselves as Japanese, or as American, or as Chinese. Resident Koreans in Japan, for instance, are naturalizing as Japanese even as they insist on keeping and using ethnic Korean names. Other resident Koreans in Japan are fighting for local voting rights as residents without Japanese citizenship.

Nations, of course, have a difficult time with this approach, and thus the expression of this freewheeling diasporic identity—with its demands for multiple inclusion and rights—is welcome neither in the homeland nor in the countries of residence. Accommodation between nations and diasporas like the Korean diaspora remains an ongoing and difficult process. Despite all the border crossing, decentering, and transcending, nations remain powerful forces. But, examining migration and diaspora on its own terms allows scholars to think beyond the nation and to recognize the ways in which migrants are imagining different constructions of community, of history, and of identity.

Notes

1. The two defining texts have been Bong-Youn Choy, *Koreans in America* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1979) and Illsoo Kim, *New Urban Immigrants: The Korean Community in New York* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). Only recently, such as with the work of Kyeyoung Park on Koreans from Latin America, have U.S. scholars studying Korean migration looked beyond U.S. borders.
2. Until the work of anthropologist Lee Kwang Gyu in the 1980s, the vast majority of published research within Korean Studies on Korean migration or on overseas Koreans concerned the independence movement. Within Korean studies internationally, there is still very little research on Korean migration or on diasporic Korean communities. What research there is has been limited to anthropology or sociology, with very little in history. A special volume of *positions; east asian cultures critique* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press) focused on Korean diaspora. The *Korean and Korean American Studies Bulletin* (New Haven, Conn.: East Rock Institute), a relatively obscure journal, is one of the few Korean Studies forums that regularly publishes in Korean migration and recently published a series of four issues focusing on Korean diaspora. See volumes 10 and 11, published from 1999 through 2001.

3. See Daniel Boo-Duck Lee, "Korean Women Married to Servicemen" in *Korean American Women Living in Two Cultures*, Young In Song and Ailee Moon, eds. (Los Angeles: Academia Koreana, Keimyung-Baylor University Press, 1997), 94–123. The quoted statistic is on page 97. Statistics on the actual number of Korean women who entered the United States as wives of U.S. military personnel are not kept by any agency, but must be teased out of records kept by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the City of Seoul's records of marriages between Korean citizens and citizens of foreign countries, and records kept by the South Korean Emigration Office. With these sources and others, Lee has compiled the most complete figures available on this subject.
4. *Ibid.*, 96–97.
5. These figures come from the Overseas Koreans Foundation and the Ministry of Health and Welfare in South Korea, August 2004.
6. See Ilsoo Kim, *New Urban Immigrants*, and Kyeyoung Park, "'10,000 Senora Lees': The Changing Gender Ideology of Korean-Latina-American Women in the Diaspora," *Amerasia* 28:2 (2002): 161–181.
7. See works by Lee Kwang Kyu, such as *Sye-gye Sok-ae Han Minjok, Suntaek Badeun Han Minjok* (Seoul: Uri Munhaksa, 1992); *Jae-Jung Hanin [Koreans in China]* (Seoul: Iljokak Press, 1994); and *Jae-Woi Dongpo [Overseas Koreans]* (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2000).
8. Although Public Law 271, also known as the War Brides Act, was passed in 1945 to allow soldiers to bring their wives to the United States, no provision was made for brides from Asian countries. At that time, immigration from most Asian countries was legally prohibited as a result of several laws passed during the 1910s and 1920s. Several amendments to Public Law 271 allowed Asian wives of soldiers to enter the United States, but these amendments expired within one or two years (Ms. Cho appears to have entered the U.S. under one of these amendments.). It was not until 1952 that the law was changed to allow Asian wives of U.S. citizens entry into the United States without legal discrimination. For a discussion of the changes in the law, see Michael C. Thornton, "The Quiet Immigration: Foreign Spouses of U.S. Citizens, 1945–1985" in *Racially Mixed People in America*, Maria P. P. Root, ed. (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 64–76.
9. This brief life narrative of Ms. Cho is taken from the longer version published in Ji-Yeon Yuh, *Beyond the Shadow of Camptown* (New York: New York University Press, 2002).
10. The United States recruited heavily in South Korea and the Philippines for nurses and other medical professionals, spurring tremendous growth in nursing schools in both countries. For a brilliant study of the phenomenon in the Philippines, see Catherine Ceniza Choy's *Empire of Care*.
11. Grandmother Lee narrated her life story to me during multiple sessions in 1999 at her home in the American South.

12. Andrei Lankov discusses some of these purges in relation to ethnic Koreans with Soviet citizenship. See *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945 to 1960* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002).
13. See Meredith Woo-Cumings, "The Political Economy of Famine: The North Korean Catastrophe and its Lessons," unpublished article, Dec. 7, 2001. Draft available on the web at www.asck.org/reports/woocummings1.pdf.
14. The South Korean government sponsored numerous organizations of northerners whose sole purpose was to propagandize on the evils of communism and support the ruling regime of the South. For a study of the northerners based on extensive fieldwork in villages where they congregated and settled, see Kim Gwiok, *Wollam-min-eu Saeng-hwal Gyunghum-gwa Jeong-chae-seong* [*The Life Experience and Identity of Northerners Who Came South*] (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1999).
15. Jang Young Cheol, *Dangsin-deul-I Geu-rukke Jallasseo-yo* [*Are You Really So Much Better Than Us?*] (Seoul: Sahwe Pyeongron, 1997). Jang defected to South Korea following the fall of the Berlin Wall while he was a student in East Germany, attended Sogang University in Seoul, and eventually started a chain of cold noodle shops. His memoir details the difficulties of adjusting to a capitalist society, the contempt and disinterest of South Koreans, and his changing views about both North and South Korea.
16. Jung, Pan-ryong. *Saegye Sok-ae Han Oori Minjok* [*Koreans in the World*] (Yanji City, China: Yanbian University Press, 1997).
17. From a personal conversation in Yanji City, China in 1999.